January 20th 1944, journalists visited US 5307th Composite Unit at Camp Deogarh, Central Provinces, India.

January 20th 1944, journalists visited US 5307th Composite Unit at Camp Deogarh, Central Provinces, India.

The unit's commanding officer Frank Merrill was also present. During this visit, James Shepley of Life Magazine came up with the Merrill's Marauders nickname for the unit. 

Dave Richardson of Yank Magazine, who actually remained to report alongside the unit, preferred Dead End Kids as the nickname as he observed the soldiers not as a group of elite marauders but rather a high-spirited ragtag band of volunteers and cast-offs.

Officially, they were the 5307th Composite Unit.To the transportation planners, they were Shipment 1688. Operationally, they were Galahad Force. 

The story of their campaign in the jungles of northern Burma showed the capabilities of this improvised force of American soldiers.

 They gained surprise by undertaking seemingly impossible marches through mountainous jungle and defeated numerically superior forces of the Imperial Japanese Army that previously had an aura of invincibility in jungle warfare. 

They gained and held their objective despite too few supplies, too much disease, planners that did not understand special operations forces (SOF) and, in the end, exhaustion.

 Some 80+ years after they became the U.S. Army’s largest special operations force to be sent into battle in World War 2, this unit – intended to last only for one 90-day combat mission – is part of the heritage of today’s Rangers.

The 5307th originated at the August 1943 Quebec Conference of the Anglo-American political and military leadership. 

The charismatic British Brigadier Orde Wingate described how he had organized the Chindits, SOF light infantry, and infiltrated behind Japanese lines in Burma. 

Politicians, generals, and public alike were hungry for news of victories from the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater of war, where there had been little except defeats.

Wingate offered hope of success in the CBI in 1944. President Franklin Roosevelt committed to send ground combat units to fight under Wingate. 

The chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold, enabled the formation and deployment of what became the Air Commandos to support Wingate. 

The difficult coalition command relationships in the CBI – where U.S., British, and Chinese Nationalist strategic interests all widely differed – made it imperative that the United States have “boots on the ground” in Burma.

The U.S. Army pulled together a force of volunteers, mixing combattested infantrymen that had fought the Japanese on Guadalcanal and in New Guinea, and others, jungle-trained, from garrisons in the Panama Canal Zone and Caribbean, with shortfalls made up from Army correctional facilities. 

A provisional force, intended for only one mission, its personnel arrived with no official commander or staff, no shared loyalties, no shoulder insignia, no colors, and limited cohesion. 

Few in the U.S. Army had any experience or knew about special operations, whether Wingate’s or any other model.

On February 24, 1944, the Marauders, (2,750 strong) crossed the Patkai mountain range and entered the Burmese jungles. 

Constantly outnumbered by the Japanese, the 5307th managed to outmaneuver, outrun, and out fight the enemy on many occasions.

 Additional support came from the Office of Strategic Services (precursor to the CIA) when Kachin scouts provided valuable human intelligence on enemy movements. 

Elements of the IJA 18th Infantry Division were scattered throughout Burma and the Marauders engaged them on almost thirty separation occasions. 

Despite being numerically inferior to the Japanese, the Marauders were always able to inflict more casualties than they sustained.

The Marauders utilised light infantry tactics, aiming to avoid pitched battles, in order to offset the fact that they were always outnumbered and could not receive reinforcements. 

They would penetrate far behind enemy lines, cut off Japanese supplies, isolate enemy units and attack patrols. They never sought to destroy enemy forces, only to sow destruction.

The armaments of the Marauders favoured this kind of engagement. Travelling light, through dense jungle, the men had no motor transport, being provided with mules. Due to this the heaviest equipment they could take were 60mm mortars and bazookas. 

This limited the defensive capabilities of the unit, but their offensive capabilities were furthered with an increased proportion of automatic weapons. 

These weapons, with a high rate of fire, could go some way to negating the fact that in every engagement the Marauders were outnumbered.